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A particularly unsettled area of the law in recent years has been
the sensitive and emotionally-charged subject of termination of medical
treatment.
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I. Introduction
A particularly unsettled area of the law in recent years has been
the sensitive and emotionally-charged subject of termination of medical
treatment.' Until recently, the most common question presented to the
courts was whether to allow the removal of a respirator2 from a coma-
tose patient existing in a chronic vegetative state.3 The 1976 landmark
case4 involving Karen Ann Quinlan was the beginning of the evolution
of case law recognizing a patient's right to have treatment discontinued
based on the fundamental right to privacy.5 Today, the removal of a
respirator is routinely performed without judicial intervention.
A new aspect to this area of medical-legal ethics however, has re-
1. This discussion will focus on discontinuation of medical care, as opposed to
compelling treatment. Compelling treatment involves such cases as ordering blood
transfusions for a Jehovah's Witness or surgery for a severely deformed newborn. See,
e.g., United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D.C. Conn. 1965); Wis. v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972).
2. A respirator can be inserted in one of three ways: through the mouth or
through the nose into the trachea (windpipe), or if needed for a long period of time it
can be surgically inserted in an incision in the throat. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDI-
CAL DICTIONARY 1347 (25th ed. 1974).
3. Since the reader may not be familiar with some of the medical terms, they
will be defined. A chronic vegetative statemeans "a condition in which one retain[s]
the capacity to maintain some of the vegetative portions of neurological functions, such
as body temperature, breathing, blood pressure, heart rate, chewing, swallowing, sleep-
ing, and walking . . . but . . . no longer possess[es] any cognitive functions. [Such a
patient has] lost the sapient functions of the brain, which control one's relation to the
outside world via the capacity to talk, see, feel, sing and think." In re Quinlan, 70 N.J.
10, 24, 355 A.2d 647, 654 (1976).
4. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). The widely publicized case of
Karen Ann Quinlan was initiated when this twenty-one year old woman became coma-
tose, following ingestion of alcohol and drugs, and was placed on a respirator. When it
became apparent that she was in a chronic vegetative state, her father requested court
permission to discontinue the respirator since her physicians were unsure of the state of
the law. Quinlan did not die after the respirator was removed and remains alive in a
nursing home hooked up to a nasogastric feeding tube and IVs.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 31-39.
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cently come to light. This issue is whether there is a corresponding
right to remove intravenous lines (IVs) and nasogastric feeding tubes6
which are keeping hopeless patients alive indefinitely. Until very re-
cently this ethical issue was not even within the imagination of the le-
gal or medical communities. However, the rapid technological advance-
ments occurring daily in the field of medicine has left the law in a state
of confusion. Medical progress has given us the ability to delay death
with methods unheard of several decades ago.7 Arguably, when a ter-
minally ill patient is subjected to increased pain and suffering and to a
loss of dignity in exchange for a longer life span in an unconscious,
irreversible state, this medical progress is not humanitarian progress.
Courts have been reluctant to lay down specific guidelines for the fami-
lies and doctors of such unfortunate patients. The resulting uncertainty
about the legal ramifications of removing IVs and feeding devices often
causes doctors to practice medicine more out of concern for the legal
consequences than out of concern for the patient's well being.8
This note reviews the latest developments in the area of termina-
tion of medical treatment. In particular, a recent California Court of
Appeals decision, Barber v. Superior Court,9 provides a useful frame-
work for analyzing the issues. It will be shown how several courts have
taken the logical view that the judicial process is too cumbersome and
unresponsive in this area of the law. Judicial intervention in these cru-
cial medical decisions is often untimely. 10 There is a pressing need for
specific legal guidelines so that physicians and families can make intel-
ligent decisions without facing potential civil or criminal liability.
After a review of the background of the medical and legal issues,
6. Nasogastric tubes are thin rubber catheters inserted through a patient's nose
which extend into the stomach to provide liquid nourishment. Artificial feeding can
also be provided through an artificial surgical opening into the stomach (a gastros-
tomy). DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 637 (25th ed. 1974).
7. Twenty or thirty years ago an unconscious patient would have had to be hy-
drated by intravenous feeding only, since nasogastric tubes were not yet in use. Rust,
Lifelines, Fine Lines, STUDENT LAW., Jan. 1984, at 12, 15.
8. "The modern proliferation of substantial malpractice litigation and the less
frequent but even more unnerving possibility of criminal sanctions would seem, for it is
beyond human nature to suppose otherwise, to have bearing on the practice and stan-
dards as they exist." Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 46, 355 A.2d at 666.
9. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
10. Decisions are often handed down after the patient has died. In re Colyer, 99
Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983); In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303,
cert. granted, 95 N.J. 195, 470 A.2d 418 (1983); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420
N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
[Vol. 9
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this note will focus on the most recent decisions which conclude that
there is no need for routine judicial supervision to authorize ending
treatment. Finally, this note outlines the logical guidelines these cases
present for withdrawing life-support equipment from incompetent pa-
tients, so that appropriate decisions can be made without fear of
liability.
II. The Historical Development of Termination of Medical
Treatment Case Law
How society has approached the issues of death, dying, and eutha-
nasia in the past requires some clarification in order to properly narrow
the specific area covered in this note. Mercy killing is medically defined
as "an easy or painless death."11 The legal definition is "the act or
practice of painlessly putting to death persons suffering from incurable
and distressing disease as an act of mercy."12 Euthanasia comes from
the greek words eu, meaning painless, and thanatos, meaning death.
Active euthanasia means ending the life of an incurable patient
through positive action, as by administering a drug overdose. Passive
euthanasia means failure to take positive action to sustain an incurable
patient's life. Euthanasia can also be with the patient's consent, volun-
tary euthanasia, or without the patient's consent, nonvoluntary eutha-
nasia. Euthanasia refers to mercy killing of all types. This note is re-
stricted to discussing passive euthanasia, 13 meaning the intentional
withdrawal or withholding of available medical means for the prolonga-
tion of life of a patient who has little or no hope of survival.' 4
As medical technology becomes more sophisticated, medical and
legal opinion as to when death occurs also evolves.15 Prior to 1968 the
11. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 553 (25th ed. 1974).
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 497 (5th ed. 1979).
13. The distinctions between these forms of euthanasia can mean the difference
between first degree murder and legally permissible conduct. See generally Foreman,
The Physician's Criminal Liability for the Practice of Euthanasia, 27 BAYLOR L.
REV. 54 (1975).
14. Ward, Euthanasia: A Medical and Legal Overview, 49 J. KAN. B.A. 317
(Winter 1980).
15. This medical-legal dilemma is commensurate with the medical- legal di-
lemma at the other end of the spectrum, determining when life begins. Justice
O'Connor, dissenting in Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health recognized that
due to advances in medical technology, past decisions are often on a collision course
with each other in the abortion context. 462 U.S. 416, -, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2507
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
1984]
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commonly accepted standard to determine death was the permanent
cessation of respiration and circulation.16 But advances in the medical
field, such as respirators, pacemakers, and cardiac medications, have
enabled physicians to generate artificial breathing and circulation when
the capacity to do so naturally has been irreversibly lost.17 Therefore,
the traditional means for determining death is no longer satisfactory
when dealing with artificially maintained bodies. 18 As a result of this
inadequacy the brain-death standard for determining death emerged
and is now widely accepted.' 9 Brain death has been further defined as
16. The classical definition of death is "a total stoppage of the circulation of the
blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent thereon, such as
respiration, pulsation, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
17. See generally Brennan & Delgado, Death: Multiple Definitions or a Single
Standard?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1323 (1981).
18.
The most frequent causes of brain death are massive head injuries, massive
spontaneous brain hemmorhage secondary to complications of hyperten-
sion, or rupture of a congenital berry aneurysm, and lack of blood pumped
into the brain because of cardiac arrest or systemic hypotension. Brain
death occurs when the swelling is so severe that the pressure within the
cranial cavity exceeds the pressure of blood flowing into the brain and the
brain stem, causing cerebral circulation to cease. In this condition, there is
no clinical evidence of brain function. Intense stimulation may bring no
response or voluntary motor movements, and there are no eye movements
at the brain stem level. Spontaneous respiration ceases because the vital
respiratory centers of the brain have been destroyed. The patient depends
entirely on mechanical support to maintain cardiorespiratory function.
Normal cardiac functioning can be achieved, mechanically, even in the
presence of total brain destruction, and can continue for as long as an hour
after a patient is pronounced dead and the respirator discontinued.
However, mechanical maintenance of heartbeat and circulation can be
continued only for a limited period of time when the brain stem has been
destroyed. It is this limited survival period that distinguishes between brain
death and the persistent vegetative state. In the later state, irreversible
damage occurs to the cerebral cortex, but the brain stem continues to
function. Considerations involved in dealing with this condition are entirely
different from these [sic] involved in brain death and require the drawing
of a line between severe dysfunction and no function at all. ...
Determination of whether cessation of brain function has occurred may be
made in a matter of minutes. The decision as to whether it is irreversible
may require several days. Ingestion of suppressant drugs and low body
temperature may cause a reversible loss of brain function, so these pos-
sibilities must be screened out before a person is pronounced brain dead.
In re Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 417-18, 617 P.2d 731, 736-37 (1980).
19. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Ex-
[Vol. 9
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either partial or complete.
For medical and legal purposes, partial brain impairment must be
distinguished from complete and irreversible loss of brain functions
or 'whole brain death.' The cessation of the vital functions of the
entire brain - and not merely portions thereof, such as those re-
sponsible for cognitive functions - is the only proper neurologic
basis for declaring death. This conclusion accords with the over-
whelming consensus of medical and legal experts and the public.2 0
Even though the brain death standard is now universally accepted,
often a court will authorize the withdrawal of life-prolonging equip-
ment when, even by the brain wave criteria, the patient's brain is not
dead. This was the situation in Leach v. Akron General Medical
Center,21 which recognized the patient's right, through a guardian, to
refuse life-sustaining treatment after four months on a respirator, arti-
ficial feeding and urinary catheter, even though she was not brain
dead.22 The court addressed the medical, moral, and legal dilemma
which often accompanies termination of treatment decisions. The
Leach court allowed life-sustaining equipment in general to be discon-
nected when it is clear that a person is near certain death, but sus-
tained by artificial means.23 Leach, however did not address the ques-
amine the Definition of Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J. A.M.A. 337
(1968) reports the criteria for brain death as:
1. lack of receptivity and response to painful stimuli;
2. no spontaneous movements or breathing;
3. no reflexes; and a flat EEG, indicating a total absence of brain activity
(these tests must then be repeated with the same results twenty four hours
later);
4. no evidence of hypothermia or central nervous system depressants.
Id. at 338-40.
20. Abram, The Need for Uniform Law on the Determination of Death, 27
N.Y.L.ScH. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (1982).
21. 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
22. See Note, Constitutional Law: Right to Privacy - Removal of Life-Support
Systems, 16 AKRON L. REV. 162 (1982).
23.
While she cannot be classified as dead, she can be classified as being very
near death, and that is the crux of the problem.
The problem before this court is not life or death. That question has
already been decided. Edna Marie Leach is going to die. She is on the
threshold of death, and man has, through a new medical technology, de-
vised a way of holding her on that threshold. The basic question is how
1984]
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tion of whether IVs or artificial feeding are part of a life-support
system.24
Passive euthanasia can be viewed as a "humanitarian easing of
terminal suffering."2 5 The medical community acknowledges that pas-
sive euthanasia is a common occurrence, even with the ever-present
threat of malpractice and criminal sanctions. As many as seventy-five
percent of American physicians permit patients to die by withdrawing
life-prolonging equipment, usually when so requested by the patient or
a family member.26 In In re Quinlan27 the court noted that "it is per-
fectly apparent . . . that humane decisions against resuscitative or
maintenance therapy are frequently a recognized de facto response in
the medical world to the irreversible, terminal, pain-ridden patient, es-
pecially with familial consent. And these cases, of course, are far short
of " 'brain death.' "28
Courts often make a distinction between ordinary and extraordi-
nary treatment. Ordinary measures are regarded as obligatory, but ex-
traordinary measures are not. A more precise distinction would be to
refer to the use of a respirator as extraordinary treatment, while com-
fort or pain relief measures would be considered ordinary treatment. 29
Courts recognize that physicians distinguish between curing the ill and
easing the dying. The Quinlan court acknowledged that it is a balance
"particularly difficult to perceive and apply in the context of the devel-
opment by advanced technology of sophisticated and artificial life-sus-
taining devices." 30 Although such devices are valuable and even essen-
tial for the curable patient and thus ordinary treatment, they are
"'extraordinary' in the context of the forced sustaining by cardio-re-
long will society require Mrs. Leach and others similarly situated to re-
main on the threshold of certain death suspended and sustained there by
artificial life supports.
Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 6, 426 N.E.2d at 812.
24. This issue is first addressed in Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d
1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 58-88.
25. See THE DILEMMAS OF EUTHANASIA 69 (J. Behnke & S. Bok eds. 1975).
26. See C., BARNARD, GOOD LIFE/GOOD DEATH: A DOCTOR'S CASE FOR Eu-
THANASIA AND SUICIDE 52 (1980); see also Medical Ethics: The Right to Survival:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974).
27. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
28. Id. at 47, 355 A.2d at 667 (emphasis original).
29. Ward, supra note 14, at 5.
30. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 48, 355 A.2d at 667.
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spiratory processes of an irreversibly doomed patient."'1 As a result,
many doctors "have refused to inflict an undesired prolongation of the
process of dying on a patient in irreversible condition when it is clear
that such 'therapy' offers neither human nor humane benefit.
32
A. Constitutional and Common-Law Issues
The Quinlan court was the first to recognize a person's fundamen-
tal right to privacy as justification for authorizing withdrawal of a res-
pirator. Although there is no explicit right to privacy in the Constitu-
tion, the Quinlan court determined that the penumbra of specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights includes the right of personal privacy,
including terminating medical treatment.3 3 This constitutionally-pro-
tected interest in personal privacy is often found to have its source in
the language of the first, fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amend-
ments.34 The Supreme Court had already included such personal deci-
sions as the right to use contraception and to receive an abortion as
falling within the protection of the right of privacy. In the celebrated
case of Roe v. Wade35 the Supreme Court extended the right to privacy
to a woman's decision to terminate a first trimester pregnancy. In
Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court found the fundamental right
to privacy "broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline
medical treatment under certain circumstances .. "36
Although the United States Supreme Court has never addressed
the specific question of an incompetent, terminally ill patient's right to
terminate treatment, some of the Justices have articulated that the
right to privacy assures control over one's own body and self-auton-
omy.3 7 As early as 1891 in the case of Union Pacific R.R. v. Botsford,38
the Court first recognized the privacy interest as the right of "every
31. Id. at 48, 355 A.2d at 668.
32. Id. at 47, 355 A.2d at 667.
33. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484 (1965) (concluding that the penumbra of the first, third, fourth and fifth amend-
ments protects privacy).
34. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (a narrow holding
stressing the constitutional interest in the privacy of the home).
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
37. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 219 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(another abortion decision based on the theory of the right of privacy).
38. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
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individual to the possession and control of his own person."'39 The right
to be left alone as mentioned in the 1969 Supreme Court decision of
Stanley v. Georgia40 appears to extend this concept. Even Justice Car-
dozo as early as 1914 stated that "every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body .... "41
Each individual's inalienable right to self-determination was ex-
tended into the medical field as the tort doctrine of informed consent.42
This doctrine requires that a patient must give consent to any medical
procedure after the risks, alternatives and nature of the treatment have
been explained. Medical malpractice suits have been initiated under va-
rious theories, such as assault, battery, negligence or trespass, but the
patient's right to bodily control remains the basis of informed consent.
According to this premise, even if an individual makes decisions irra-
tionally or incorrectly, he must nonetheless be permitted the right of
choice. This is also known as the common-law right to be free from
bodily invasion which is essentially a matter of private concern beyond
the reach of the courts.
Consequently, the constitutionally based right of privacy and the
recognized common-law right to be free of bodily invasion support a
strong argument for allowing patients to assert their choice of the time
of death in a natural manner without unwanted medical intervention.
However, courts have not yet recognized an absolute right to discon-
tinue life support systems. There is a limitation on such conduct if it is
outweighed by public policy considerations. Courts use a traditional
balancing test. If the state's interest in protecting its citizens outweighs
the individual's fundamental right to privacy, the state may be able to
deny that right. In Superintendent of Belchertown State Schools v.
Saikewicz4 3 the court enumerated and considered the following four
state interests:
(1) the preservation of life;
(2) the protection of innocent third parties;
(3) the prevention of suicide; and
39. Id. at 251.
40. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See supra note 34.
41. Scholendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E.
92, 93 (1914).
42. See generally Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical
Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 228-
64 (1973).
43. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
[Vol. 9
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(4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical
profession.44
The preservation of life is the most important of the state's inter-
ests. But courts afford it less weight when there is no reasonable possi-
bility that the patient will return to a cognitive and sapient condition.
As noted in Quinlan: "We think that the state's interests contra weak-
ens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily
invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately, there comes a
point at which the individual's rights overcome the state interest." '45
This emphasis on the quality of life is at the heart of these decisions. A
terminally ill comatose patient often no longer has a life he would wish
to prolong. Accordingly, as in Saikewicz, the courts should distinguish
between an artificially maintained vegetative life and a valuable, cura-
ble life.46
Joseph Saikewicz was a profoundly retarded sixty-seven year old
patient afflicted with terminal, incurable leukemia. The court allowed
his guardian to refuse the use of chemotherapy as in his best interests,
since the disease was invariably fatal and treatment would cause signif-
icant side effects and discomfort.47 The court distinguished between
curing the ill and comforting the dying:
The essence of this distinction in defining the medical role is to
draw the sometimes subtle distinction between those situations in
which the withholding of extraordinary measures may be viewed as
allowing the disease to take its natural course and those in which
the same actions may be deemed to have been the cause of death.48
B. The Physician's Liability
Any physician making a decision to terminate medical treatment
faces the possibility of criminal and civil liability. The two doctrines
which are applicable to the physician's liability are informed consent 49
and standard of care. Without consent, a medical treatment or opera-
44. Id. at 425.
45. 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664 (emphasis original).
46. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
47. Id. at 729-30, 370 N.E.2d at 420. This is the case most often quoted in
support of a requirement of judicial intervention.
48. Id. at 738, 370 N.E.2d at 423.
49. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
1984]
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tion can be a technical battery, even if the results are satisfactory.50
The standard of care doctrine requires that a physician use "that skill,
knowledge, and training possessed by an average member of the profes-
sion in the same or similar locality."51
There is little precedent on the subject of criminal liability when
medical treatment has been terminated without judicial approval. It
appears that a physician will be protected as long as he uses good faith
judgment that is not unreasonable by medical standards.52 Although
the possibility of criminal actions against doctors is a deterrent to prac-
ticing good medicine, it should be noted that there are relatively few
prosecutions and virtually no convictions under these circumstances. 53
Juries often return verdicts of not guilty in recognition of the humanity
of ending treatment, although the letter of the law may be clearly
different.
This discrepancy between the written law, which considers with-
drawal of treatment illegal, and the reality of what courts and juries
actually do, leaves the medical practitioner in a quandary. 54 Physicians
are often forced to practice defensive medicine, ordering unnecessary
diagnostic tests or superfluous treatment simply to avoid legal liability.
As a result, terminal, comatose patients are often left in a virtual state
of suspended animation, held on the threshold of death by modern
machines.
C. Living Wills
It should be noted that twenty-two states have enacted natural
death legislation 55 which in essence legalizes passive euthanasia if there
is a properly executed living will. 56 As admirable as the concept of liv-
50. See generally Comment, Euthanasia: The Physician's Liability, 10 J. MAR.
J. PRAC. & PROC. 148 (1976).
51. Ward, supra note 14, at 322.
52. See Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A Prosecutorial View of the Quin-
lan Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 304, 310-11 (1977).
53. See generally Foreman, The Physician's Criminal Liability for the Practice
of Euthanasia, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 54-61 (1975).
54. See generally Note, In re Storar: Euthanasia for Incompetent Patients, A
Proposed Model, 3 PACE L. REV. 351-74 (1983).
55. Tifft, Debate on the Boundary of Life, TIME, April 11, 1983 at 70; see also
Flaherty, A Right to Die?, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 14, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
56. A living will is "a document, similar to a will, executed by a person during
his lifetime setting forth his wishes concerning medical treatment in contemplation of
illness or death." Note, In re Living Will, 5 NOVA L. J. 445 (1981).
[Vol. 9
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ing wills may be, however, even its proponents acknowledge that only
the most motivated of individuals are likely to take the anticipatory
step of preparing such a document.57 It is typical human nature to pro-
crastinate and ignore the need for such arrangements. Therefore, the
vast majority of difficult decisions involving terminating treatment will
not have the advantage of a written directive to help guide the
physician.
III. Recent Case Law
The courts in several states have been extremely active in recent
years in handling medical decisionmaking cases. Many courts have
taken new approaches and suggested rational and practical guidelines
for terminating treatment. These guidelines provide caregivers and
families of irreversibly ill patients some reassurance as to the propriety
and legality of their decisions concerning discontinuation of medical
treatment.
A. Barber v. Superior Court
The preceding background material on how termination of treat-
ment cases have been handled in the past can be compared with the
recent enlightened decision handed down in the case of Barber v. Supe-
rior Court.5 8 The California Court of Appeals dismissed murder
charges against two doctors who had removed the feeding tubes from
fifty-five year old Clarence Herbert, a man severely brain-damaged fol-
lowing routine abdominal surgery. After general anesthesia during an
operation to remove a colostomy bag, Mr. Herbert suffered a cardi-
opulmonary arrest in the recovery room. Attempts to resuscitate him
were successful only to the point of leaving him permanently brain-
damaged and in a coma.5" His family insisted on removal of all life
support devices, including IVs and nasogastric feeding tubes, stressing
that Mr. Herbert had clearly stated before surgery that he did not
want to be kept artificially alive.
After consultation with the family and in compliance with the
57. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
58. Id. at 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 484 (1983). Los Angeles County District At-
torney Robert Philibosian, in a brief to the California Supreme Court, asked them to
decertify the case. Reaves, Cutting Off the IV, 70 A.B.A. J. 31 (Feb. 1984).
59. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
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family's wishes, the physicians found themselves embroiled in a dra-
matic precedent-setting medicolegal episode when charged with murder
by Los Angeles prosecutors.6" The court of appeals acknowledged that
this case belies the commonly expressed belief that such decisions
would most likely not become the subject of criminal prosecution. 61
Many physicians in private consultation with families of hopeless pa-
tients routinely withdraw IV and nasogastric tube nourishment. The
case of Clarence Herbert appears to be the first instance of a criminal
prosecution for the medical decision of removing life-sustaining
equipment.62
The appeals court reviewed the superior court finding that al-
though the doctor's conduct was well motivated, ethical, and sound in
the eyes of the medical profession, it was unlawful under California
law. 63 The court also defined the concepts of excusable or justifiable
homicide, stating that they "evolved and were codified at a time well
prior to the development of the modern medical technology which is
involved here, which technology has caused our society to rethink its
concepts of what constitutes 'life' and 'death' ".64 The Barber prosecu-
tion resulted from the gap between the statutory law and recent medi-
cal developments. In discussing this gap between technology and the
law, the court clearly was aware that extremely personal and painful
decisions concerning terminally ill patients are made even more difficult
because of the lack of clear legal guidelines.6 5
The Barber court recognized that although Clarence Herbert was
not brain dead, the physician was left with the responsibility of al-
lowing him to remain in a vegetative state without higher cognitive
brain functions. 6 Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court in a 1980
case67 recognized the physician's dilemma and stated the issue:
60. Reaves, supra note 56 at 31.
61. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1014, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
62. Id. at 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488. Prior to the Barber case, courts were
usually involved merely for the purpose of obtaining declaratory judgments or guide-
lines for hospitals and physicians to follow before ending treatment, and not in a crimi-
nal context.
63. Id. at 1012, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
64. Id. at 1013, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
65. Id. at 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
66. Id. at 1014, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
67. Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980);
Mr. Herlihy, attorney for Mr. Severns, originally asked for a court order to remove the
fifty-seven year old Mrs. Severns from the respirator and artificial feeding, but the
[Vol. 9
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Now, however, we are on the threshold of new terrain-the penum-
bra where death begins but life, in some form, continues. We have
been led to it by the medical miracles which now compel us to
distinguish between "death" as we have known it, and death in
which the body lives in some fashion but the brain (or a significant
part of it) does not.68
1. IVs and Nasogastric Feeding Tubes
As the issue of removing hydration and nourishment is sure to
arise in the future, the Barber opinion will likely be quoted as the first
ever to compare the removal of IVs and feeding tubes as being similar
to the removal of respirators. Prior to Barber no court had ever specifi-
cally allowed the removal of IVs and artificial feeding devices. This was
a very important comparison, reflecting the court's view that there is no
morally relevant distinction between the two forms of mechanical
devices.
In examining this issue we must keep in mind that the life-sus-
taining technology involved in this case is not traditional treatment
in that it is not being used to directly cure or even address the
pathological condition. It merely sustains biological functions in or-
der to gain time to permit other processes to address the pathology.
The question presented by this modern technology is, once under-
taken, at what point does it cease to perform its intended function
and who should have the authority to decide that any further pro-
longation of the dying process is of no benefit to either the patient
or his family? 9
The result of the Barber decision was that the surgeon and the
request was later amended to mean only the respirator. She was weaned from the respi-
rator in the five months it took the Delaware Supreme Court to reach a decision and
remains in a vegetative state in a nursing home. The reasons given for asking only that
the respirator be removed were first, the husband and family were somewhat queasy
about the artificial feeding request, and second, in discussion with the doctors involved
and the hospital, it was determined that the hospital personnel would have some diffi-
culty handling such a situation. Also, the attorney recognized that by asking for an end
to feeding, the decision would be going beyond Quinlan and would cause the case to be
considerably prolonged. Telephone interview with Thomas Herlihy III, attorney for
Mr. Severns (July 19, 1984).
68. Id. at 1344.
69. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
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internist would not have to go to trial for the death of Clarence Her-
bert because their medical decision, "though intentional and with
knowledge that the patient would die, was not an unlawful failure to
perform a legal duty. ' 70 The court did not consider the withdrawal of
heroic life support measures as an affirmative act, but rather an omis-
sion of further treatment.7' Once the treatment has been proven inef-
fective the physician no longer has a duty to continue it.72 This reason-
ing resolved the critical issue of determining the duties owed by a
physician to a patient who was extremely unlikely to have any mean-
ingful recovery of cognitive brain function. 73
In this monumental decision, the court touched on what is perhaps
the crux of the medical-legal-ethical dilemma involved. There is a psy-
chological burden inherent in the thought of, as opponents of the deci-
sion may put it, starving and dehydrating a patient to death. The court
was aware of "the emotional symbolism of providing food and water to
those incapable of providing for themselves. . . . Plainly, food and
water normally provide a net benefit to most patients most of the
time.75 Naturally, if there is any doubt as to the benefit provided, feed-
ing may be continued because of the usual moral standards and be-
cause food is symbolic of human life that is "inescapably social and
communal. ' 76 Treatment may be appropriate for most patients but not
be suitable in a particular case because of the burdens it would place
on the patient. In judging all forms of medical care, it seems proper to
determine whether the particular patient will derive a net benefit.
Since hospitals routinely remove respirators from hopeless patients
without fear of legal action, the court rationally extended the Quinlan
standards to artificial feeding in the same type of situation. Since air
provided by artificial means is allowed to be discontinued, the court
also allowed food provided by artificial means to be withdrawn. It has
been noted that this decision was the natural culmination of this is-
70. Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
71. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
72. Id. at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
73. Id. at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
74. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
75. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, Commissioners and Professional Staff of the
Recent President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research at 19, In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464
A.2d 303 (1983), rev'd, - N.J. - (1985) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Amicus
Curiae].
76. Callahan, On Feeding the Dying, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 22 (Oct. 1983).
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sue.71 For years, much of society has accepted this point of view as
proper. Although it may offend many people to dehydrate a patient, the
Barber decision appears to be the natural evolution in the law. The
Barber case appears to reflect the feeling that "[w]here a terminally ill
patient's coma is beyond doubt irreversible and there are adequate
safeguards to confirm the accuracy of the diagnosis, all means of life
support may be discontinued."7
The Barber decision could have a tremendous impact on the body
of case law that allows treatment to be terminated and may relieve
some physicians from having their conduct viewed in a criminal con-
text. It is important to recognize that life support decisions are essen-
tially medical determinations with facts unique to each. As far back as
the Quinlan case, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
[T]here must be a way to free physicians, in the pursuit of their
healing vocation, from possible contamination by self-interest or
self-protection concerns which would inhibit their independent
medical judgments for the well-being of their dying patients. We
would hope that this opinion might be serviceable to some degree
in ameliorating the professional problems under discussion.19
2. Barber's Guidelines for Future Conduct
The landmark case of Clarence Herbert may give families and
physicians of terminal patients additional reassurance in their decision-
making. While noting that the legislature is better suited for adopting
specific procedural rules, the court laid down "general guidelines for
future conduct." 80
Three difficult determinations to be made in each case were enu-
merated as follows:
(1) the point at which further treatment will be of no reasonable
benefit to the patient;
(2) who should have the power to make that decision; and
77. See Reaves, supra note 56, at 31. Barry Silberman, a Los Angeles attorney,
has written several articles on this issue.
78. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 463, 464 A.2d 303, 313 (1983), rev'd, -
N.J. - (1985) (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL AssoCIATION'S COUNCIL ON JUDICIAL
OPINIONS 2.11 (Jan. 10, 1981)).
79. 70 N.J. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668.
80. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
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(3) who should have the authority to direct termination of
treatment.8'
3. Proportionate Treatment
In discussing the issue of which life-prolonging procedures must be
used and for how long, the Barber court rejected the ordinary versus
extraordinary treatment approach.82 Instead the court suggested it
would be more rational to determine whether the proposed treatment is
proportionate to "the benefits to be gained versus the burdens
caused."'83 It defined proportionate treatment as that which "has at
least a reasonable chance of providing benefits to the patient, which
benefits outweigh the burdens attendant to the treatment."84 Although
an IV or feeding tube may be minimally painful and not as intrusive as
a respirator, if there is no chance of recovery, the treatment is dispro-
portionate to the potential benefits.
Whether treatment is worth enduring depends on facts unique to
each case. The Barber court follows the Quinlan standard that "the
focal point of decision should be the prognosis as to the reasonable pos-
sibility of return to cognitive and sapient life, as distinguished from the
forced continuance of [a] biological vegetative existence. . . ."85 If a
patient has virtually no chance of recovery and the medical consensus
is that he will remain in a chronic vegetative state, then there appears
little reason to force continued IV hydration or nasogastric tube feed-
ing, especially since the law permits a respirator to be removed without
controversy. Courts in various jurisdictions continue to distinguish be-
tween artificially sustained vegetative existence and cognitive existence.
Cognitive existence is the state of being able to communicate, think,
feel, express emotions, and relate to one's surroundings.86 In other




84. Id. at 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491; see also President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, De-
ciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, A Report on the Ethical, Medical and
Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions (Mar. 1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSIO N]. This Commission reported on an array of bioethical topics and issued
eleven reports addressing issues of medical practice and public policy.
85. 70 N.J. at 51, 355 A.2d at 669.
86. See infra note 95.
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death, but would at least hope to provide "a remission of symptoms
enabling a return towards a normal, functioning, integrated
existence.""7
4. Substituted Judgment and Best Interests Standards
The second issue the Barber court addressed was who should make
the decision to end treatment. The patient, of course, should make the
decision when possible. However, the most controversial cases involve
patients incapable of such decisionmaking. Appropriate decisionmaking
in the medical field is aided by judicial recognition of two legal stan-
dards when dealing with incapacitated patients. These are substituted
judgment and best interests.88 The substituted judgment standard al-
lows a surrogate decisionmaker to make a choice that as closely as pos-
sible reflects the desires of the incapacitated person. The best interests
standard is used when there is no evidence of what the patient would
want. The latter is more of an objective criteria than the former. The
substituted judgment standard reflects the incapacitated patient's indi-
vidual wishes. Any concrete evidence of prior conversations or expres-
sions of opinion as to what the patient would want should be consid-
ered. Arguably, examining a patient's earlier stated preferences should
be morally and legally necessary, and honoring the person's preference
should be a clear obligation. Only when a patient's preferences are un-
known should it be left to the surrogate decisionmaker to make the
decision that serves the patient's best interests. The decision should
take into account the interest in sustaining life, the relief of suffering,
possible side effects of continued treatment, as well as the quality of
life.89
5. Who has Authority to Make the Decision
The final issue addressed by the Barber court was the necessity of
judicial intervention in these cases. The court's conclusion was that it is
unnecessary and unwise to require prior judicial approval before with-
87. In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 470, 380 N.E.2d 134, 138 (1978).
This decision went to the issue of whether it was proper to withhold resuscitation from
an elderly, terminally ill patient, without judicial approval. It permitted a no code order
by the attending physician which directs the hospital personnel not to use extraordinary
measures to resuscitate a patient in cardiac or respiratory arrest.
88. PRESIDENT'S CoMMIssIoN, supra note 84, at 134.
89. Id. at 135.
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drawing treatment. On this issue Barber again agreed with the Quinlan
court: "We consider that a practice of applying to a court to confirm
such decisions would generally be inappropriate, not only because that
would be a gratuitous encroachment upon the medical profession's field
of competence, but because it would be impossibly cumbersome." 90 In
other words, the courts discourage routine requests to the judiciary on
these decisions. The judicial system does remain available in controver-
sies where there is family disagreement over the incompetent's wishes
or the physicians disagree as to the prognosis. A court may intervene if
malpractice or wrongful motives are in evidence. Thus, the court sys-
tem is a final safeguard.
B. In Re Colyer9'
Another recent decision, In re Colyer, examined the roles of
guardians, physicians and courts, in these treatment decisions. Recog-
nizing that determining a particular patient's prognosis is a medical
decision, the Washington Supreme Court's suggestion is that a progno-
sis board should confirm the attending physician's diagnosis.92 This pro-
cedure would provide protection against those who possibly may be mo-
tivated by other interests, such as an inheritance. The vast majority of
physicians take their professional oaths seriously and consider their pa-
tients' interests above all others'. The Quinlan court was the first to
address the issue of possible impropriety in medical decision making
and recommended formation of a hospital ethics committee. Such a
group is composed of doctors, attorneys, social workers and theologians.
The purpose of such a diverse selection is to allow the responsibility for
such a momentous decision to be spread over a large component of so-
ciety with divergent views. The Quinlan court held that if the recom-
mendations of such a committee are followed, no civil or criminal lia-
bility would ensue.
The Colyer court agreed with others who have criticized such an
ethics committee "for its amorphous character, for its use of nonmedi-
cal personnel to reach a medical decision, and for its bureaucratic in-
90. 70 N.J. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
91. 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983). It should be noted that all these
courts take the view that the legislature is better suited to establish these guidelines,
but that in the absence of such guidance, the judiciary does suggest procedures to be
followed.
92. Id. at 134, 660 P.2d 749.
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termeddling. ' '9 3 It felt that a prognosis board composed of professional
colleagues who have an understanding of the patient's medical condi-
tion would be adequate protection "against erroneous diagnoses as well
as questionable motives." '94 A unanimous concurrence that the patient
cannot return to a sapient state within any reasonable medical
probability is sufficient to allow discontinuance of life-prolonging
treatment.
95
As to the potential criminal liability for such conduct, as long as
there is good faith compliance with the court's suggested procedure, the
action would not be criminal.96 The Quinlan court gave two reasons for
not considering an ensuing death homicide. First, death would be from
existing natural causes, not from stopping the treatment. Second, it
would not be unlawful even if it were homicide because "the action
would be based on the exercise of a constitutional right and, as such,
would be protected from criminal prosecution. 9 7
93. Id. Sixty-nine year old Bertha Colyer had a zero chance of returning to any
meaningful existence after a heart attack resulting in massive brain damage. She had a
close family familiar with her beliefs and character.
While we do not accept the Quinlan court's view that judicial intervention
is an encroachment upon the medical profession, we do perceive the judi-
cial process as an unresponsive and cumbersome mechanism for decisions
of this nature. This fact is borne out by a number of the leading cases in
which arguments were heard and opinions written long after the patient
had died. (Citations omitted). Obviously, the court system could not re-
spond in a timely manner to the relief sought in those situations. More-
over, the formalities of a legal determination might chill a guardian's re-
solve to assert the rights of his ward.
Id. at 127, 660 P.2d at 746.
94. Id. at 138, 660 P.2d at 749.
95. An expert witness, Dr. Fred Plum, at the Quinlan trial explained vegetative
and sapient brain function:
We have an internal vegetative regulation which controls body tempera-
ture, which controls breathing, which controls to a considerable degree
blood pressure, which controls to some degree heart rate, which controls
chewing, swallowing and which controls sleeping and waking. We have a
more highly developed brain which is uniquely human which controls our
relation to the outside world, our capacity to talk, to see, to feel, to sing, to
think.
Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654.
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C. In Re Conroy9
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of
appropriate guidelines for stopping artificial feeding in the case of In re
Conroy. Conroy involved another patient who died before a final deci-
sion was handed down. Conroy was in a nursing home suffering from
severe organic brain syndrome, necrotic decubitus ulcers, urinary tract
infection, arteriosclerotic heart disease, diabetes and hypertension. 9
The New Jersey Superior Court originally held that nasogastric tube
feeding could be stopped, at her nephew's request, after determining
that Conroy "had no cognitive or volitional functioning."'100 The state
won a stay of the order from the appellate court. With the nasogastric
tube still in place, Conroy died of natural causes two weeks later.
Although Claire Conroy had already died, making the conflict
merely hypothetical, the appellate court concluded that the issues
should be resolved because of their great public importance. Even when
patients have died, courts consistently agree to decide terminally ill pa-
tients' rights to refuse life-sustaining treatment.101 The Conroy court
decided that since the issues involved are recurring, yet typically avoid
review because of the patient's death, the case should continue; other-
wise, future parties of interest would have no guidance. 102
The New Jersey Superior Court would not have allowed the artifi-
cial feeding to be stopped because they concluded that Claire Conroy
was not comatose, not facing imminent death, nor in a chronic vegeta-
tive state.10 3 They interpreted the medical testimony to hold that since
Conroy was sapient, the state's interest in preserving life was substan-
tial and overrode the patient's right to privacy. This court distinguished
her from the Quinlan case by pointing out that she was not subject to
twenty-four hour intensive nursing care and not maintained on any
mechanical devices. The fact that Conroy was awake but very confused
98. Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (1983), rev'd, - N.J. - (1985).
99. Organic brain syndrome is manifested by disorientation, intellectual and
memory impairment and unstable emotional response. 1 SCHMIDT'S ATTORNEYS' Dic-
TIONARY OF MEDICINE B-99 (17th ed. 1984). It is not the same as senile dementia,
which is "[a] chronic brain disorder caused by organic (structural) changes, associated
with old age." 3 id. at S-65.
100. In re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 524, 457 A.2d 1232, 1233 (1983).
101. Conroy, 190-N.J. Super. at 456, 464 A.2d at 306.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 459, 464 A.2d at 309.
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was determinative.104 She was a substantially different type of patient
from the asleep, vegetative Quinlan. The court would, however, more
likely have allowed termination of treatment had Conroy been incur-
able and terminally ill, brain dead, comatose or vegetative.
The court pointed out that withholding artificial feeding under
Conroy's circumstances would violate general ethical precepts. In re-
viewing both sides of the ethical debate, the court noted, "[t]here is
substantial disagreement among ethicists whether the provision of food
and water should ever be considered extraordinary treatment. . . .To
some, the natural and ordinary quality of feeding dictates that it should
never be withdrawn.' 0 5 U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop holds a
similar view: "Withholding fluids or nourishment at any time is an im-
moral act."' 0 6 Others feel that if the patient is hopeless the "burden of
continued feeding is disproportionate to the benefit it will effect.'1 0 7
The appeals court expressly declined to resolve that particular issue,
however, and the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in early 1985
provided specific guidelines which help to clarify the issue.
After discussing general ethical concepts, the Conroy appellate
court then looked to the medical ethics involved. The Hippocratic Oath
provides that the physician's main obligation is never to harm any-
one.10 8 The Conroy court was convinced that removing the feeding tube
would violate medical ethics as well as general ethics, since active eu-
thanasia has always been considered unethical. 0 9 In Conroy's situation,
since she was not comatose, the appeals court felt that nourishment was
an essential element of ordinary care which her physicians were ethi-
cally obligated to provide."10
The appeals court concluded that removing the feeding tube under
Conroy's circumstances amounted to active euthanasia rather than the
generally accepted passive euthanasia. The court was concerned that
Conroy would die from dehydration and starvation rather than from
104. Id. at 460, 464 A.2d at 310.
105. Id. at 463, 464 A.2d at 313.
106. Tifft, Debate on the Boundary of Life, TIME, April 11, 1983 at 68, 69.
107. Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. at 463, 464 A.2d at 313.
108. The Hippocratic Oath, the ethical guide of the medical profession, states: "I
will prescribe regimen for the good of my patients according to my ability and my
judgment and never do harm to anyone. To please no one will I prescribe a deadly
drug, nor give advice which may cause his death ... " DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 715 (25th ed. 1974).
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her existing medical condition.11 The New Jersey Supreme Court re-
cently reversed the appellate court and clarified the issue so that fami-
lies and physicians can have some reassurance that their decisions will
not result in criminal or civil liability.
IV. Proposals
The Barber decision in California was an important step in clarify-
ing the law on terminating artificial feeding. When the New Jersey
Supreme Court decided the issue in Conroy it provided needed guid-
ance to families and physicians. 1 By reversing the appellate court's
decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court now allows life-sustaining
treatment to be withdrawn or withheld when it is clear that the patient
would have refused the treatment. Since there is so little legal prece-
dent in this narrow body of case law, many patients in other jurisdic-
tions will be affected by the legal implications of this decision.
The crux of the problem lies in allowing courts to establish general
standards for all patients, when, arguably decisions should be made
based on facts unique to each case, preferably within the patient-physi-
cian-family unit. Medical intervention is normally allowed when it will
improve the patient's well-being, but the benefits and burdens such
treatment will afford must be judged depending on the individual pa-
tient's values and goals, and not on a court's holding that establishes as
a matter of law that artificial feeding always provides a substantial
benefit." 3
Allowing treatment to be stopped when the patient is unlikely to
gain any medical benefit from continued treatment is a less restrictive
and more satisfactory legal standard." 4 A treatment appropriate for
most patients may be unsuitable in an individual case where it imposes
unbearable burdens. 115 Courts should not be relied on to make actual
treatment decisions. This often turns out to be the case when there are
misunderstandings about what procedures are correct. Since the judi-
cial route tends to be time-consuming and costly these medical deci-
sions should remain the responsibility of physicians and family. It
should be made clear that medical treatment should be judged by
!11. Id. at 465, 464 A.2d at 315.
112. Id. at 456, 464 A.2d at 306.
113. Id. at 478, 464 A.2d at 314.
114. Id. at 466, 464 A.2d at 310.
15. See Brief for Amicus Curiae supra note.75, at 21.
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whether a particular patient will benefit from it.
Medical decision-making often involves caregivers and surrogates
acting on behalf of incapacitated patients. Collaboration between at-
tending physician and family, in advancing the patient's best interests,
will eliminate the risks of self-interest and superficiality which some-
times occur. If a decision is made based on full informdtion and delib-
eration, carelessness and discriminatory behavior are less likely to
occur.
Because recourse to courts as a routine matter is unduly cumber-
some, institutional ethics committees can still play an important role in
the decision-making process. These committees can review each case in
a less expensive and more suitable setting. Institutional ethics commit-
tees can act more quickly than the courts; however, the committees
may still refer to the courts when intractable disagreement occurs.
Even when the committee refers the matter to the judicial process, the
court should rely on the ethics committee's full report, enabling the
court to make an informed decision which is less subject to error and
less expensive. Of course, the court's decision should still be limited to
a question of fact whether the treatment accomplishes a medical
benefit.
The judiciary has proposed many suggestions and guidelines in the
years since the landmark Quinlan decision. Because of these evolving
legal and medical standards, attorneys and physicians need to be aware
of legal precedent as it exists today. In many states only lower court
opinions exist and often are in conflict with those of other jurisdic-
tions." 6 Courts should address this pressing medico-legal problem by
delegating responsibility to the patient-doctor-family unit.1 7 Thus,
116. D. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING 5
(1981).
117. The American Medical Association Judicial Council believes that courts or
legislatures may not provide the best forums for discussion of issues of euthanasia or
terminal illness. It recommends the following standard:
(1) The intentional termination of the life of one human being by an-
other-mercy killing or euthanasia-is contrary to public policy, medical
tradition, and the most fundamental measures of human value and worth.
(2) The cessation of the employment of extraordinary means to prolong
the life of the body when there is irrefutable evidence that biological death
is imminent is the decision of the patient and/or his immediate family
and/or his lawful representative, acting in the patient's best interest.
(3) The advice and judgment of the physician or physicians involved
should be readily available to the patient and/or his immediate family
and/or his lawful representative in all such situations.
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courts would be relieved from making life-and-death decisions more ra-
tionally left to the medical realm. The inconsistency of the various
courts' approaches, understandable since euthanasia is such a complex
issue, points out the necessity for allowing physicians, patients and
families to use their own discretion in termination of treatment
decisions.
If courts set forth principled standards, it would ensure that health
care professionals and families would be responsible for acting accord-
ing to the patient's desires, if known, otherwise in the patient's best
interests. The courts should also substantially defer to careful decisions
made in accordance with such standards.
Mary Stetson Lingerfeldt
(4) No physician, other licensed health care providers, or hospital should
be civilly or criminally liable for taking any action pursuant to these guide-
lines, nor should there be any criminal or civil penalties of any sort im-
posed for conduct pursuant to these guidelines.
(5) Except as stated above, all matters not in the public domain relating to
a patient's terminal illness are the private right of the patient and are pro-
tected from public scrutiny by the privacy and confidentiality of the physi-
cian-patient relationship.
Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. at 465, 464 A.2d at 315 (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N
JUDICIAL COUNCIL, OPINIONS AND REPORTS 5.17 (1979)).
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